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I. Introduction
Random stops of commercial vehicles, done to conduct administrative searches to
ensure compliance with safety regulations, may, at first blush, alarm our notions of
privacy and Fourth Amendment constraints against police activity.' The constitutionality
Rebecca Gregory is an Assistant United States Attorney in the Northern District of Texas.
Ms. Gregory was a Visiting Associate Professor at the SMU Dedman School of Law from
1998-2001. Ms. Gregory briefed and argued United States v. Fort, 248 F.3d 475 (5th Cir. 2001)
on behalf of the United States. The views expressed herein may not necessarily reflect those
of the Department of Justice.
1. The Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments are implicated when any vehicle is stopped and its
occupants are detained because such action is considered a seizure within the meaning of
these amendments. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 556-58 (1976). Stationary
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of such warrantless searches, conducted without probable cause or reasonable suspicion,
was before the Fifth Circuit recently in the case of United States v. Fort, 248 F.3d 475
(5th Cir. 2001). Although the decision drew a dissent, the majority held that, because
commercial trucking is a "pervasively regulated" industry, such stops were permissible
under the Texas statutory scheme. Much rested on the outcome. Were state troopers
required to first obtain warrants before stopping carriers, it would be virtually impossible
to enforce state and federal safety regulations. Were officers required to have probable
cause or reasonable suspicion of a violation before stopping trucks, most violators would
continue unabated, risking the lives and property of themselves and of other motorists.
In fact, numerous types of safety violations are not readily observable to officers on
patrol. Additionally, the mobile nature of carriers makes a warrant requirement not
only impractical, but also absurd. With the safety concerns recently raised by the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the eventuality that millions of Mexican
trucks may soon be traveling on Texas highways, the Fort decision takes on even more
significance.
A. UNITED STATES V. FORT
On September 4, 1999, State Trooper Michael Scales was monitoring commercial
traffic on Interstate 20 in Parker County, Texas. At approximately 8:00 A.M., he observed
a truck that caught his attention. As the truck passed, the trooper heard the truck's wheel
making a sound described as a "flop." This sound is commonly associated with a tire
that is either flat or has a flat spot, either of which is a violation of the motor carrier
safety regulations. The trooper was additionally concerned because he did not recognize
the company name on the side of the truck. Based on those two observations, Scales
stopped the truck for a commercial vehicle safety inspection.2 The driver of the truck,
Alvester Fort, told the trooper that he was traveling alone.
The trooper visually inspected the truck and completed a license and inspection
report. The report noted numerous violations of the federal safety standards including
failure to make proper driver log entries; bad tires; improper tallights; lack of a file
extinguisher, reflectors, flares, fuses and a battery cover; damaged windshield; and a
defective speedometer. Fort was issued a ticket for several of the violations. Additionally,
in accordance with Department of Public Safety (DPS) policy, Trooper Scales ran a
computerized check, which disclosed that Fort had an outstanding warrant from the
State of Louisiana.' The warrant was for a probation violation that related to possession
of marijuana. When questioned concerning it, Fort replied that he thought his lawyer
had taken care of it. Trooper Scales told Fort he would have to accompany him to the
checkpoints are viewed differently from roving patrol or random stops of vehicles because
the subjective intrusion is appreciably less in the case of checkpoint stops. Id. at 558.
2. Commercial vehicle inspections involve determining whether the truck is operating interstate
or intrastate; checking the driver's license, logbook, registration, and bill of lading on the
load; as well as inspecting the vehicle itself. United States v. Fort, 81 F. Supp. 2d 694, 695
(N.D. Tex. 2000), aff'd, 248 F.3d 475 (5th Cir. 2001).
3. Because this was a valid stop, the trooper was permitted to check Fort's license for outstanding
violations. See United States v. Dortch, 199 F.3d 193, 198 (5th Cir. 1999); see also United
States v. Zucco, 71 F.3d 188, 190 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding that an officer can request license,
insurance, registration, run a computer check thereon, and issue a citation).
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Parker County Sheriff's Office so the matter could be resolved. The truck was secured at
a nearby truck stop and the two men went to the sheriff's office where the outstanding
warrant was confirmed and Fort was booked.
Because the warrant was for possession with intent to deliver drugs, Scales asked
the canine unit to conduct a "walkaround" of the trailer and truck. The DPS narcotics-
detecting canine was taken to the location and "alerted" on an area between the cab
and the trailer. Trooper Scales also contacted the El Paso Information Center (EPIC) to
determine whether there were any intelligence reports on either Fort or his company,
BAMA Trucking.4 EPIC is an intelligence center that maintains a database on narcotics
trafficking. The return information from EPIC reflected two DEA open files on the
company and/or the driver. Trooper Scales returned to the Parker County jail, asked Fort
if he was transporting illegal contraband, which he denied, and inquired whether he
would give consent to search the truck and trailer, which he did. Scales asked for the keys
and was told that Fort had given them to a friend named Levi. Although Fort initially
told the trooper he was traveling alone, he later said that Cornelius Levi was in the truck
at the time of the stop. Scales, accompanied by another trooper, immediately returned
to the truck and searched for Levi. Unable to find Fort's companion, the two troopers
opened the unlocked driver's door and took the narcotics canine inside the truck. When
the dog showed no interest, they took him to the trailer, broke the seal, and entered.5
Inside, the troopers found a bulk load of pungent, rotting potatoes lying unpackaged and
scattered across the trailer floor. Located at the front of the trailer were stacks of wooden
pallets holding six canvas duffel bags. The four-foot canvas bags contained forty-one
bundles of marijuana, wrapped in plastic. Fort was indicted for possession with intent
to distribute the 560 pounds of marijuana.6
Fort moved to suppress the evidence, essentially arguing that the trooper's decision
to stop him was random and therefore unconstitutional.7 At the suppression hearing,
the prosecutor took the position that he was not relying on the tire noise as grounds to
support the stop. Therefore, neither the district court nor the court of appeals considered
this fact in determining the constitutionality of the stop,' each concluding that the
4. The BAMA Trucking Company was owned by Fort and his wife.
5. Seals are thin aluminum strips numbered to match the bill of lading and can be purchased
at any truck stop. It is not unusual for troopers performing inspections to break such seals,
which are easily replaced with another seal bearing a new number.
6. See 21 U.S.C. §841(a)(1) (1999).
7. Fort's Motion to Suppress focused its attack on the initial stop. The search and seizure that
followed were not challenged except as fruit of the poisonous tree. Presumably, this was
because the search was consensual. See Fort, 81 F. Supp. 2d at 696-97. In considering a ruling
on a motion to suppress, questions of law are reviewed de novo and factual findings for clear
error. The evidence is reviewed in the light most favorable to the prevailing party. Dortch,
199 F.3d at 197.
8. At the suppression hearing, DPS Trooper Mike Scales testified that while routinely monitoring
commercial traffic, he noticed that the truck driven by Alvester Fort had a faulty tire or tires.
The sounds emitting from the tires were consistent with there either being flat or perhaps
lacking sufficient tread, which are violations of the motor safety regulations. Based on this,
he pulled the truck over for a safety inspection. Trooper Scales noted numerous violations
of the federal safety standards for which a citation was issued.
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Government waived its right to rely on this fact.9
Following the suppression hearing, Fort's motion was denied.' Fort then entered
into a plea agreement, but expressly reserved his right to appeal the denial of his motion
to suppress." He was sentenced to twenty-one months imprisonment. Fort took this
issue of first impression 2 to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals arguing that the stop
Following the trooper's testimony, defense counsel objected to the assertion that Trooper
Scales considered the tire noise as a basis for the stop. The objection was based on the fact that
the Government's response to the Motion to Suppress failed to include such an assertion. When
questioned by the district judge as to whether the Government was relying on the tire noise as a
specific ground to support the stop, the prosecutor replied:
PROSECUTOR: Not as a specific ground in the sense that it provides a reasonable suspicion
that illegal activity or a violation of the law has taken place, Your Honor. It simply points out
that Trooper Scales-let me go-go forward with it.
Trooper Scales advised me-after I had received information, returned the brief, I relied
on Agent Farrow's report regarding a routine commercial traffic safety inspection. It was only
after talking specifically with Trooper Scales that I found out about the hearing of the tire
that caught his attention as to the truck and then the fact that he was unfamiliar with the
BAMA trucking as the reasons that he decided to conduct the safety inspections of this truck.
The government would-an argument in its brief-suppose that the trooper has the right
to go ahead and stop a truck for safety inspection even without having observed or heard a
wheel that was obviously flat or had a flat spot on it.
But it's simply a fact that has been presented to the court. The government would allow the
court can [sic] consider it in determining the overall validity of the actions taken by Trooper
Scales during the entirety of the course of action of the investigation.
THE COURT:... You're relying on it as background and not reasonable suspicion or
probable cause for the stop?
PROSECUTOR: That is correct, Your Hujxui.
This constituted the basis for concluding that the Government waived its right to argue those
facts as a basis for the stop and for the ensuing analysis that the stop was purely random.
Fort, 81 F. Supp. 2d at 695.
9. Id. at 695 n.2.
10. See id. at 694.
11. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 1 l(a)(2) allows a defendant to enter a conditional plea
of guilty while reserving the right to appeal an adverse pretrial ruling. FED. R. CRIM. PROC.
1 l(a)(2) (West 2000).
12. A similar issue was before the State court in Scheneki v. State, 30 S.W.3d 412 (Tex. Crim. App.
2000). In that case, a game warden stopped Schenekl in order to conduct a routine water
safety check. The warden observed signs of intoxication and arrested him for boating while
intoxicated. Schenekl argued the statute authorizing random boat stops violated the Fourth
Amendment. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held that the state's interest in promoting
safety considered in conjunction with a statutory scheme that allowed for minimally intrusive,
brief, random inspections was reasonable. See $217, 590.000 in United States Currency v. State,
970 S.W.2d 660, 664-65 (Tex. App. 1998), rev'd on other grounds, 18 S.W.3d 631, 632 (Tex.
2000) (court noted statutory power to "enter and detain" where stop was based on observing
a violation).
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was random and therefore in violation of the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against
unreasonable searches and seizures.' 3 Before the Court was the constitutional propriety of
administrative stops and searches of commercial vehicles made without probable cause,14
without reasonable suspicion, and without a warrant.
B. ADMINISTRATIVE INSPECTIONS OF PERVASIVELY
REGULATED INDUSTRIES
The Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures
applies to private commercial property and to administrative inspections designed to
enforce regulatory statutes.' However, the expectation of privacy in commercial prop-
erty is different from a similar expectation in an individual's home. 6 The expectation is
particularly attenuated in commercial property used in "closely regulated" industries."
Indeed, certain industries "have such a history of government oversight that no rea-
sonable expectation of privacy... could exist for a proprietor over the stock of such an
enterprise."'8 When an individual engages in a pervasively regulated business, he does so
with knowledge that his business will be subject to inspection. 9 Using this reasoning, the
Supreme Court has upheld warrantless administrative searches of pervasively regulated
businesses in a variety of situations.2"
In New York v. Burger, the Supreme Court summarized the regulatory warrantless
search doctrine of businesses in "closely regulated" industries by articulating a three-part
test.2' Burger involved the seemingly random administrative inspection of an automobile
junkyard for compliance with New York regulations.2" First, the Court reiterated that
because individuals who operate in a closely regulated industry have a reduced expec-
tation of privacy, the warrant and probable cause requirements that satisfy the Fourth
Amendment standard of reasonableness for a government search have less application. 23
This exception to the warrant requirement is justified by the important role of periodic
inspections conducted to enforce regulatory schemes and by the reduced expectation of
privacy flowing from pervasive regulation.24 For this reason, a warrantless inspection of
a pervasively regulated industry will be deemed reasonable if (1) there is a substantial
state interest that informs the regulatory scheme to which the inspection is made; (2) the
13. See Fort, 248 F.3d at 477.
14. "Probable cause" is the measure applied to cases when determining whether the Fourth
Amendment's reasonable requirement has been satisfied thus permitting the issuance of a
warrant. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534 (1967).
15. See Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 312-13 (1978).
16. See Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 598-99 (1981).
17. New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 700 (1987).
18. Marshall, 436 U.S. at 313.
19. United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 316 (1972).
20. See Burger, 482 U.S. at 707-09; see also McDonald v. State, 778 S.W.2d 88, 91 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1989).
21. 482 U.S. at 702-03.
22. Id. at 694 n.2.
23. Id. at 702.
24. Id. at 704-07, 710.
354 Law and Business Review of the Americas
inspection is necessary to further the regulatory scheme; and (3) the regulatory program
provides an adequate substitute for a warrant in terms of the certainty and regularity of
its application.2" The Fifth Circuit utilized the Burger standards in determining whether
the Texas statutory scheme passed constitutional scrutiny.26
C. THE TRUCKING INDUSTRY IS A "PERVASIVELY REGULATED" INDUSTRY
As DEFINED By Burger
There is no doubt that commercial trucking is closely regulated by the states and
the federal government.27 The federal highway administration has promulgated volumi-
nous rules and regulations governing the commercial trucking industry. These rules and
regulations control virtually all aspects of commercial vehicles including maintenance,
equipment, load, and operation-from lights to mud-flaps, repairs to reports. Regula-
tions dictate who can drive, how they can drive, and when they can drive.2" Texas has
adopted most of these regulations in the Texas Transportation Code, which it administers
in conjunction with other requirements.2 9
Prior to the Fort decision, the Fifth Circuit had not directly addressed the question
whether commercial motor carrier vehicles could be subjected to warrantless adminis-
trative inspections by a state.30 At the outset, the Fifth Circuit came to the obvious and
25. See id. at 702-03.
26. Fort, 248 F.3d at 480.
27. See United States v. Hernandez, 901 F. 2d 1217, 1221 n.4 (5th Cir. 1990) (state may regulate
commercial trucking); State v. Campbell, 875 P.2d 1010, 1012-13 (Kan. 1994) (motor carriers
pervasively regulated); Lievesley v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 985 F. Supp. 206, 210 (D. Mass.
1997) (trucking is closely regulated); see, e.g., V-1 Oil Co. v. Means, 94 F.3d 1420, 1426-27
(10th Cir. 1996); United States v. V-1 Oil Co., 63 F.3d 909, 911 (9th Cir. 1995); United States v.
Dominguez-Prieto, 923 F.2d 464, 468-70 (6th Cir. 1991); United States v. Burch, 906 F. Supp.
592, 598 (D. Kan. 1995), aff'd, 153 E3d 1140, 1141 (10th Cir. 1998) (random stop for safety
inspection valid). For state cases upholding random inspections of commercial vehicles as
valid regulatory searches, see State v. A-A Disposal, 415 N.W. 2d 595 (Iowa 1987) (random
safety inspection valid); Drive Trans. Corp. v. New York City Taxi and Limousine Comm'n,
513 N.Y.S.2d 920, 921 (1987); State v. Williams, 648 P.2d 1156, 1162 (Kan. Ct. App. 1982)
(random commercial stop constitutional); People v. Velez, 441 N.Y.S.2d 176, 181-82 (N.Y.
Crim. Ct. 1981); cf United States v. Seslar, 996 F.2d 1058 (10th Cir. 1993) (random stop of
rental truck prohibited as not heavily regulated industry). The Kansas statute cited in Burch
is similar to the Texas scheme that allows purely random stops and searches. 906 F. Supp. at
597. In contrast, Tennessee's statute, cited in Dominguez-Prieto requires "reasonable belief"
that a vehicle is operating in violation of the regulations; however, it is not apparent from
reading the facts that the initial decision to stop the truck was other than random. See 923
F.2d at 465-66, 470.
28. See Dominguez-Prieto, 923 F.2d at 468.
29. See tex. admin. code ann. §3.62(c)(5) (West 1999) (the Director of the Texas Department of
Public Safety is authorized to adopt rules regulating the safe operation of commercial motor
vehicles). With a few specified exceptions, the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations were
adopted in Texas. Id. §3.62(a); see also tex. transp. code ann. §644.051 (Vernon 1999); 49
C.F.R. §§301-99 (2000).
30. In Marshall v. Texoline Co., 612 F.2d 935 (5th Cir. 1980), the court upheld the warrantless
inspection provisions of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977 as they applied to
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inarguable conclusion that the trucking industry is pervasively regulated. This laid the
groundwork for applying Burger's three criteria.
31
1. The Government's Interest in Regulating Commercial Trucking
The need to regulate motor carrier equipment, drivers, cargoes, etc., in order to
protect the state's citizens and infrastructure, is compelling. Texas has a substantial gov-
ernmental interest in ensuring that the commercial motor vehicles traveling its highways
and smaller roads are in good, safe condition and are driven by trained, alert, and com-
petent drivers. The concern over highway safety is reflected in our local laws and in the
federal statutes and regulations that have also been adopted by Texas.32 Congress long
ago recognized the public's interest in enhancing commercial motor vehicle safety so as
to reduce highway fatalities, injuries, and property damage.3 3 In Texas, the pervasiveness
of commercial motor vehicles-typically larger and heavier than passenger vehicles-
raises serious safety concerns. 34 One need only traverse the roads to know that countless
thousands of common carrier vehicles perpetually operate on our highways. 3 Again,
the inevitable conclusion reached by the Court was the recognition that the state "has
a substantial interest in traveler safety and in reducing taxpayer costs that stem from
personal injuries and property damage caused by commercial motor carriers.36
quarry operations. Later, in United States v. Thomas, the court recognized the exception to
the warrant requirement in an apparently random search of an automobile salvage business.
973 E2d 1152, 1155-56 (5th Cir. 1992); see also United States v. Cobb, 975 F.2d 152, 156 (5th
Cir. 1992) (warrantless search of salvage business).
31. Although the issue was one of first impression for the Fifth Circuit, other circuits that have
ruled on the issue have found similar stops constitutional. See Burch, 153 F.3d at 1141-42
(Burger applied to stop of truck); Means, 94 F.3d at 1425-28 (warrantless stop of commercial
vehicle); V-1 Oil Co., 63 F.3d at 911 (Burger applied to facility whose trucks hauled hazardous
material); Dominguez-Prieto, 923 E2d at 468.
32. See Int'l Bd. of Teamsters v. Dep't of Transp., 932 F.2d 1292 (9th Cir. 1991); United States v.
Abreu, 730 F. Supp. 1018 (D. Colo. 1990).
33. See 49 U.S.C. §31131(b) (1997). Motor carrier safety became a matter of federal concern in
the 1930s. See Interstate Commerce Commission Reports-Motor Carrier Cases, Ex Parte No.
MC-3, Submitted Dec. 5, 1939 (Commissioners recommended promulgating federal regula-
tions governing qualifications, hours of service, operation and equipment to promote safety).
One of the factors used to determine whether an industry is "pervasively regulated" is whether
it has a long tradition of close government supervision. See Donovan, 452 U.S. at 605-06.
Although duration of oversight is an important factor, it is only one of the criteria that will
be considered. Id. at 606. Were this not so, new industries such as nuclear power plants
would not be subject to warrantless searches. Id. The vehicle dismantler industry at issue in
Burger had only been subject to government oversight since the 1950s. 482 U.S. at 705-06.
34. Regulated vehicles include those weighing in excess of 26,000 pounds. See also tex. admin.
code ann. §3.62(c)(1).
35. In 1998, more than 500,000 interstate common carrier vehicles and more than 250,000
intrastate common carrier vehicles were registered to operate in Texas. See Texas Department
of Transportation, Pocket Facts, Motor Carrier Fiscal 1998 (updated Mar. 29, 1999).
36. Fort, 248 F.3d at 480.
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2. Random Stops of Commercial Motor Vehicles by Authorized
Officers are Reasonably Necessary to Effectively Enforce the
Regulatory Laws of Texas for the Trucking Industry
Commercial motor carriers are by definition mobile.37 They course the roadways
twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week, by the thousands, by the millions. Unan-
nounced inspections are essential to ensure that the laws regulating motor carrier vehicles
in Texas are properly enforced because drivers cannot anticipate this type of inspection
and, therefore, cannot avoid it.3 "[I]t could reasonably be concluded that random truck
safety inspections are necessary to further [protecting the public's interest] .... Trucks
can easily avoid fixed checkpoints and, by use of citizens' band radios, can avoid tem-
porary checkpoints:' 39 If a driver knows that he is in violation of the law, he can simply
locate the inspection stations and avoid them by using side roads.
Additionally, many serious violations of the safety laws are not readily apparent upon
simple observation. Driver fatigue due to exceeding the hour requirements, overweight
vehicles, defective tires (especially an inside tire), and improperly secured loads can be
missed by an officer who simply drives by the vehicle. Random stops by authorized law
officers to conduct administrative safety compliance inspections are essential to effectively
enforce and carry out the motor carrier safety statutes.40 Finally, the mobile nature of
trucks does not lend itself to inspection by means of an administrative search warrant.
"[I]f inspection is to be effective and serve as a credible deterrent, unannounced, even
frequent inspections are essential. In this context, the prerequisite of a warrant could
easily frustrate inspection. If the necessary flexibility as to time, scope, and frequency is
to be preserved, the protections afforded by a warrant would be negligible." 41 Because
trucks pass quickly through the states and out of the jurisdictions of the enforcement
agencies, the argument for warrantless inspections is even "more compelling" than the
situation presented in Burger.42
3. The Texas Regulatory Scheme Provides ' Adeqae Sub.. .. u.t
for a Warrant
The final criterion of Burger requires that the statutory scheme provide "a constitu-
tionally adequate substitute for a warrant."43 That is, it must put drivers on notice that
they are subject to searches, which are defined in their scope and conducted by officers
limited in their discretion."
37. A commercial motor vehicle means a vehicle that is self-propelled. see tex. transp. code ann.
§§621.001(1) and (5) (Vernon 1999).
38. See V-1 Oil Co., 63 F.3d at 912 (unannounced inspections ensure statute is enforced).
39. Means, 94 F.3d at 1426.
40. See Dominguez-Prieto, 923 F.2d at 468.
41. Biswell, 406 U.S. at 316 (upholding warrantless search of firearms dealer).
42. See Dom inguez-Prieto, 923 F.2d at 469.
43. 482 U.S. at 703.
44. Id.
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The Texas regulatory scheme45 allows authorized troopers to "enter or detain4 6 on a
highway or at a port of entry a motor vehicle that is subject to this chapter."47 Appropriate
officers can stop and detain a commercial motor vehicle subject to the statute in order
to conduct a safety inspection B, an "administrative search." Additionally, "[tiraffic law
enforcement officers of the department of public safety will conduct inspections of the
condition of drivers and the equipment of their vehicle to assure that safety and licensing
requirements.. . are being complied with."48 Further, the fact that commercial motor
vehicles are required to pass periodic inspections of all regulated safety equipment does
"not prohibit a State from making random inspections of commercial motor vehicles."'4 9
Officers are required to complete an inspection of a vehicle using a standardized form
and their discretion after the stop is clearly limited by Texas regulations concerning what
may be inspected (i.e., log book, bill of lading, tires)."0
Although section 644.103 has no time and place requirement for random stops
of commercial motor vehicles, such a requirement would be an absurdity. Moreover,
"the assurance of regularity provided by a warrant may be unnecessary under certain
inspection schemes."51 When a commercial vehicle is traveling it is, in essence, "open for
business." 2 It is impossible to set up a time and place requirement for random stops of
45. tex. transp. code ann. §§621.001-645.004 (Vernon 1999).
46. On appeal, Fort argued that although Texas law allows an officer to "enter" or "detain" a
commercial vehicle, it does not specifically provide for the "stop" of such vehicle. Although
this argument was adopted by the dissent in Fort, the majority was persuaded that the term
"detain" includes "stop." See 248 F.3d at 479, 483 (1. Jolly, dissenting). Under Texas law,
"words... shall be read in context and construed according to the rules of... common usage"
and common sense. As the majority recognized, common sense compels the conclusion that
the same law that empowers an officer to enter or detain a vehicle, also empowers the officer
to first stop such a vehicle. Any other construction is nonsense. In any event, the Texas
Administrative Code authorizes department of public safety officers to "stop every violator of
the traffic laws observed by them." "Congress cannot be presumed to have granted a power
to the courts and yet withheld the only effective means of implementing it." Bacon v. United
States, 449 F.2d 933, 939 (9th Cir. 1971); see Gemsco v. Walling, 324 U.S. 244, 254 & 257
(1945).
47. tex. transp. code ann. §644.103 (Vernon 1999).
48. tex. admin. code ann. §3.26 (West 2000).
49. 49 U.S.C. §§31142 (a) & (d) (1999) (emphasis added).
50. Federal regulations require that state officials use the North American Standard Inspection
form. See 49 C.F.R. §350.111 (2000).
51. See Donovan, 452 U.S. at 599 (1981) (commenting on the need for unannounced, warrantless
inspections of mines. "[A] warrant may not be constitutionally required when Congress
has reasonably determined that warrantless searches are necessary to further a regulatory
scheme and the federal regulatory presence is sufficiently comprehensive and defined that the
owner of commercial property cannot help but be aware that his property will be subject to
periodic inspections undertaken for specific purposes."); cf. Marshall, 436 U.S. 307 (Supreme
Court struck down warrantless, nonconsensual inspections conducted pursuant to a statutory
scheme giving unbridled discretion to administrative officers enforcing OSHA regulations).
52. Compare tex. transp. code ann. §644.104 (West Supp. 2000) (defining the scope of a random
premises inspection, including when and how it is performed) with §644.103 (having no time
and place requirement for random stops of commercial motor vehicles).
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vehicles as opposed to administrative searches of fixed facilities."
Section 644 specifies which officers may detain vehicles for inspection purposes
and provides for procedures, including training leading to required certification. 4 The
Transportation Code empowers the Director of the Texas Department of Public Safety
to adopt all or part of the federal regulations, which Texas has done in large measure.
The Transportation Code also mandates that Texas administrative rules be consistent
with federal regulations and that a federal motor carrier safety regulation prevails over
a conflicting Texas rule."
Thus, the statutes and regulations in place provide a constitutionally adequate sub-
stitute for a warrant because trucking companies are on notice that they are subject to
periodic inspections and examination of records to assure compliance.5 6 The laws and
regulations define who may inspect, how inspections are to be conducted, where those
inspections occur, and the scope of the agency's authority. Similarly, the federal regula-
tions specifically require that employers and drivers be aware of and comply with the
federal regulations.5 7 Inspections by authorized officers are not "discretionary acts" by
government officials but are conducted pursuant to the statutory and regulatory scheme,
relative to motor carriers.5 8 Highway patrol officers, by definition, patrol the highways.5 9
This fact alone provides motor carriers with notice that their property is subject to
scrutiny.60 Under the statutory scheme in place, truckers using Texas highways "cannot
help but be aware that [their property is] subject to periodic inspections undertaken for
specific purposes," including routine safety inspections.
61
4. The Court Giveth and the Court Taketh Away
Fort maintained that the DPS officer was required to have probable cause or at
least reasonable suspicion of a violation before it was legally permissible to stop his
truck. The Fifth Circuit correctly framed the issue: whether random warrantless stops of
commercial vehicles are permitted under the Burger decision. It then correctly concluded
iar Burge's cLliteria were satiiLCd and that thc transitory nature of the commercial
trucking makes warrantless stops even more compelling than the junkyard inspections
upheld in Burger. Fort had argued that the Supreme Court outlawed random stops, such
53. See Means, 94 F.3d at 1427; Dominguez-Prieto, 923 F.2d at 470.
54. tex. transp. code ann. §644.101 (West Supp. 2000).
55. tex. transp. code ann. §§644.002, 644.051(b) & (e) (Vernon 1999).
56. See tex. admin. code ann. §18.30 (West 2000) (advises carriers regarding inspections and
maintaining information and records).
57. See, e.g., 49 C.F.R. §§390.3(e)(1), (2), 392.1, 393.5 (2000).
58. Dominguez-Prieto, 923 F.2d at 469.
59. In Means, the Tenth Circuit commented on a Wyoming statute that similarly allows warrant-
less inspections. 94 F.3d at 1426.
60. Id.
61. Donovan, 452 U.S. at 600; see also Biswell, 406 U.S. at 316 (holding heavily regulated busi-
nesses know they are subject to inspection, understand the purpose of the inspections, and
the limits of the task); Burch, 153 F.3d at 1142.
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as his, in Delaware v. Prouse.6 2 The Court also correctly dispatched this claim resolving
that the random, suspicionless spot-checks of cars held impermissible in Prouse did
not apply to commercial trucking. After conducting the correct analysis and reaching a
sound resolution, the majority should have stopped. Instead, it concluded its discussion
by criticizing the Texas statutory scheme "for failing to provide specific limitations on
the officer's discretion in making the decision to stop." It next, incomprehensibly and
unnecessarily, relied on the DPS officer's testimony that he had observed a regulatory
violation before making the stop. This very fact, which had been earlier deemed "waived"
by the panel, was then considered by it as "background" to support the conclusion that
the "stop met constitutional muster."63
The target of the inspection in Burger was random. As noted by the Supreme Court:
"It was unclear from the record why, on that particular day, Burger's junkyard was
selected for inspection."64 Provided the three criteria of Burger are met, random stops and
inspections are allowed and necessary to further important governmental interests. The
whole import of Burger was to establish that random administrative inspections of per-
sons in heavily regulated industries was constitutionally permissible.65 This means that
in Texas, provided the officer is targeting the type of vehicle defined in the Texas Trans-
portation Code, he may stop any such vehicle as being a member of a regulated industry.
That officer may then inspect the vehicle and driver to ensure regulatory compliance.
Thus, the majority's closing observation is erroneous dicta that should be disregarded.
The dissent in Fort argued that random discretionary stops are not authorized by
either the Texas statutory scheme or by the Burger decision.66 In Texas, an officer's dis-
cretion after a regulatory stop is clearly limited. Defined officers make stops for a defined
62. 440 U.S. 648 (1972). The Court struck down random stops of motorists to check for drivers'
licenses and vehicle registration violations, absent probable cause for the stop. The Court
noted that Delaware and other states were free to develop methods for spot checks that involve
less intrusion or that do not involve the unconstrained exercise of discretion. Id. at 662.
Finding Prouse inapplicable, the Fifth Circuit noted that Prouse itself recognized an exception
to the warrant requirement for checkpoints and weigh-ins of commercial vehicles. Fort, 248
F.3d at 480. The Supreme Court made a point of stating that its holding does not "cast doubt
on the permissibility of roadside truck weigh-stations and inspection checkpoints, at which
some vehicles may be subject to further detention for safety and regulatory inspection than
are others." See Prouse, 440 U.S. at 663 n.26; see also Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496
U.S. 444, 449 & 454 (1990) (roadside weigh-stations and inspection checkpoints permissible);
Williams, 648 P.2d at 1161 (Prouse not applicable to truck traffic); United States v. Brignoni-
Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 883 (1975) (reasonable suspicion required for Border Patrol Agents to
stop vehicles, however, "[O]ur decision does not imply that the state and local enforcement
agencies are without power to conduct such limited stops as are necessary to enforce laws
regarding... truck weighs... .
63. Fort, 248 F.3d at 482.
64. Burger, 482 U.S. at 694 n.2. Junkyards were selected from a list compiled by New York City
police detectives.
65. "[T~he inspection scheme in Burger required no level of suspicion." Dominguez-Prieto, 923
F.2d at 469.
66. Fort, 248 F.3d at 483-84.
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investigation.67 Drivers who know they are required to follow regulations also know they
are subject to inspections for compliance. To limit authority on the front end, by per-
mitting stops only of persons who first create some degree of suspicion of a violation
would eviscerate the holding of Burger. Random, unannounced inspections are the only
way to ensure motor carrier laws are properly enforced because drivers cannot anticipate
this type of inspection and thereby avoid it. Drivers in violation of safety laws can easily
avoid fixed checkpoints by rerouting. Additionally, many serious violations such as driver
fatigue due to exceeding the hour requirements, overweight vehicles, defective tires and
improperly secured loads are not readily apparent by simple observation. The dissent
further misses the mark by seeming to too closely align administrative stops of heavily
regulated industries with criminal investigative detentions.68 Administrative inspections
are administrative in character and are conducted to determine compliance with a reg-
ulatory scheme; they are not police searches intended to gather criminal evidence. "An
administrative statute establishes how a particular business in a 'closely regulated' indus-
try should be operated, setting forth rules to guide an operator's conduct of the business
and allowing government officials to ensure that those rules are followed."69 Although
warrant and probable cause requirements can apply in the administrative search context,
they do not require probable cause, as it has been traditionally defined.7" The Fourth
Amendment constraints have lessened application due to the government's heightened
interest in regulating businesses.7 And, in the context of heavily regulated business,
probable cause has been eliminated entirely with warrantless, random inspections being
deemed reasonable.7 The fact that evidence of crimes may unexpectedly be discovered
while enforcing the administrative scheme does not render the search illegal.73
67. Section 644 of the Texas Transportation Code specifies which officers may detain vehicles
for inspection purposes: Officers of the Texas Department of Public Safety and peace officers
certified under section 644.101 for vehicles on highways within the territory of the officer's
municipality. See tex. transp. code ann. §644.103 (Vernon 1999).
68. The district court's decision was also arguably flawed in one regard. It applied the two-step
analysis used in Terry v. Ohio, as a prelude to its analysis. See Fort, 81 F. Supp. 2d at 694. In
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22 & 30 (1968), the Supreme Court held that before police may
"stop and frisk" an individual, such intrusion must be predicated on an officer's "reasonable
suspicion" that the person was engaged in wrongdoing, supported by specific, articulable
facts. Terry has been utilized in evaluating challenges to warrantless stops for traffic violations.
Fort, 81 E Supp. 2d at 697. Because Fort's stop was for an administrative search of a person
engaged in a heavily regulated industry, the district court's Terry analysis was unnecessary
and inappropriate. The Fifth Circuit majority opinion did not rely on Terry in its analysis.
Instead, it correctly focused purely on the Burger criteria. Reliance on general principles
governing traffic stops is "misplaced" in area of regulatory stops. Burch, 906 F. Supp. at 598.
69. Burger, 482 U.S. at 712-13.
70. See Camara, 387 U.S. at 538 (Supreme Court held that although OSHA inspectors could not
insist on entering private homes without a warrant, such warrants could issue to conduct
general inspections without a showing of probable cause to believe a violation had occurred).
71. Burger, 482 U.S. at 700. For a discussion of administrative searches and relevant cases, see
Annual Survey of Criminal Law, Investigation and Police Practices: Warrantless Searches and
Seizures, 88 GEO. L.J. 912, 978-981, n.335-38 (2001).
72. Burger, 482 U.S. at 702.
73. Id. at 716. The fact that police officers have the power to arrest, likewise, has no constitutional
significance. Police officers often have numerous duties in addition to traditional police work.
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II. Fort: On the Heels of NAFTA
The import of the Fort decision, which dealt with the stop of a domestic trucker,
takes on added significance when considered in conjunction with the safety issues raised
by the trucking provisions of NAFTA. This ruling comes on the heels of a raucous public
debate over whether Mexican truckers should have free access to American highways. At
present, trade between the United States and Mexico is conducted by means of a narrow
commercial border zone.74 Long-haul truckers transfer their loads to short-haul truckers,
so-called "bridge carriers' who take the goods across the border, through customs, and
to U.S. carriers for ongoing transportation. 75 NAFTA provided that, by 1995, Mexican
long-haul truckers would be allowed access to the border states of California, Texas, Ari-
zona, and New Mexico.76 By the year 2000, this would further expand to allow them full
access to all destinations in the United States. 77 The anticipated result: 4.5 million Mexi-
can trucks using U.S. highways. 78 About 75 to 80 percent of that truck trade would pass
through Texas, with 40 percent moving through the Dallas/Fort Worth area.79 Respond-
ing to strong opposition, former President Clinton blocked the timetable and continued
the limits requiring Mexican trucks to remain within approximately twenty miles of the
U.S. border."° Congress also began hearings that focused on the inspection records of the
Id. at 717; see also Fort, 248 F.3d at 480 n.4 (noting that "[a]lthough a regulatory scheme with
a primary purpose of general crime control might not pass constitutional muster... there is
no allegation in the instant case that the Texas statutory scheme's purpose was to uncover
evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing").
74. Tim Weiner, Mexico Vows to Retaliate Against U.S. on Trucking, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2001.
75. Id.; see also Warren A. Goff, Transportation of Cargo Across the U.S.-Mexico Border, 8 U.S.-
MEX. L.J., 3, 5 (2000).
76. Weiner, supra note 74; see also Brendan M. Case, Mexican Trucks Win NAFTA Ruling: Critics
Decry Burden of Ensuring Vehicles' Safety on U.S. Roads, THE DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Dec.
1, 2000; Michael R. Skahan, Comment: The NAFTA Trucking Dispute with Mexico: Problem?
What Problem?, 5 NAFTA: L. & Bus. REV. AM., 603 (1999).
77. Weiner, supra note 74; see also Goff, supra note 75; AP, NAFTA Panel to Rule oil Mexican
Truck Access, THE DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Feb. 6, 2001.
78. See U.S. Customs Service, Statistics for Northbound Truck Crossings from Mexico 1984 to 2000.
Estimates put the volume of trade between Mexico and the United States at five million
truckloads a year. See Jim Landers, U.S. To Allow Mexican Trucks: NAFTA Ruling Requires
Change, THE DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Feb. 7, 2001.
79. Case, supra note 76; George Kuempel, Eddie Lucio; In the Driver's Seat, THE DALLAS MORN-
ING NEWS, Jan. 7, 2001; George Kuempel, Prosperity with a Price: State Weighs Spending as
Increasing Traffic Wears Out, Clogs Roads, THE DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Mar. 4, 2001.
80. See Case, supra note 76; Steven H. Lee, Trading Place: San Antonio Sitting Pretty as Place
to Host NAFTA Hub, THE DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Jan. 16, 2001. Mexico challenged for-
mer President Clinton's decision to block the entry of its trucks into the United States; a
bi-national arbitration panel ruled in February of 2001, that Clinton's action was a violation
of NAFTA's trucking provision. Safety concerns intensified when NAFTA's arbitration panel
held that Mexican trucks should have access to all U.S. roads. Id.; see also AP, supra note 77;
Julie Watson, Mexican Truckers Say They Can't Afford U.S. Safety Rules, THE DALLAS MORN-
ING NEWS, Feb. 9, 2001. However, the panel also held that although the United States cannot
bar Mexican trucks, "it can enforce safety standards that don't have to be the same as those
for U.S. and Canadian trucks." Id.
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Mexican short-haul border truckers." Goaded by the fear of unsafe Mexican trucks,
8 2
poorly trained drivers, and the influence of the Teamsters Union, 3 Congress reacted with
both the House and the Senate discussing separate restrictions blocking NAFTA's truck-
ing provisions.8 4 Safety recommendations were published for comment in the Federal
Register.
8 5
Although the ultimate resolution is still unfolding, the problem is clear: safety con-
cerns over Mexican truckers are legitimate and present enormous obstacles to the expan-
sion and development originally envisioned by NAFTA. Mexico's freight trucks average
fifteen to twenty years of age compared to five years for most U.S. trucks.86 It would take
an estimated ten years with annual investments of one billion dollars to bring Mexico's
375,000 freight trucks into an age bracket with that of American trucks.87
Many people perceive that Mexican trucks are often unsafe. The comprehensive
regulations imposed on U.S. drivers have, heretofore, been wholly lacking in our Mexican
counterparts. In fact, "most regulations on trucking in Mexico have been lifted since
1989.' s88 For example, Mexican drivers have no hourly work limits.8 9 Mexican trucks often
carry hazardous materials.9" Post-NAFTA audits reflect that 44 percent of Mexican trucks
fail safety inspections.9' To date, it has been impossible for U.S. officers to effectively
enforce existing safety regulations. In 1998, the Department of Transportation (DOT)
announced that the Federal Highway Administration's motor carrier safety program for
commercial trucks at U.S. borders was able to inspect only about 1 percent of trucks.
92
With heavy truck traffic expected to increase by 85 percent during the next thirty years, 93
81. Statistics showed that Mexican trucks failed safety inspections 36 percent of the time. Brian
Wilson, U.S. Study to Mexicans: Keep on Truckin', N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 2001. However, long-
haul American truckers failed safety inspections 25 percent of the time. Id.
82. Id. A 1997 Department of Transportation study concluded that 50 percent of Mexican trucks
inspected at the Texas border had safety problems. See Case, supra note 76.
83. Id.
84. Proposals include requiring that Mexican carriers be subject to federal safety and insurance
audits. Id.; see also Wilson, supra note 81.
85. See Revision of Regulations and Application Form for Mexican-Domiciled Motor Carriers to
Operate in U.S. Municipalities and Commercial Zones on the U.S-Mexico Border, 66 Fed. Reg.
22328-420 (May 3, 2001) (to be codified in 49 C.F.R. pts. 368 & 387).
86. See Watson, supra note 80.
87. Id. Texas Congressman Henry Bonilla has suggested Mexican trucking companies replace
their trucks with used American trucks which would probably be safer than Mexican vehicles:
"The United States has a surplus of used trucks and Mexico needs safer trucks to meet U.S.
safety standards. Why not come together and solve both problems?" Brendan M. Case, Texas
Congressman Proposes Plan to Increase Mexican Truck Safety, THE DALLAS MORNING NEWS,
Feb. 15, 2001. For many years, Mexico has blocked sales of U.S. vehicles in Mexico. Id.
88. J. Patrick Larue, The "Ill-icit" Effects of NAFTA: Increased Drug Trafficking into the United
States through the Southwest Border, 9 CURRENTS: INT'L TRADE L.J. 38, 40 (Summer 2000).
89. Skahan, supra note 76, at 609.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Larue, supra note 88, at 39.
93. Sonny Lopez, Perry Takes Road Bonds to West Texas: Governor Says Plan Can Help Fix Highway
Problem Now; Documents Cite Risks, THE DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Mar. 2, 2001.
Summer 2001 363
enforcement will be further strained. Although U.S. agents can turn away Mexican trucks
that fail safety tests, the fact remains that it is not feasible, given tile volume of traffic,
to inspect every truck. Once inside the United States, inspection and enforcement has
been virtually nonexistent.94
Following the Fort decision, post-border administrative stops on Mexican trucks will
be possible. State troopers, already understaffed and overworked,9 can make random
stops to further ensure safety; but inspect for what? What restrictions should and will
be imposed on Mexican truckers? For some years, discussions have been underway to
have Mexican trucks meet U.S. safety standards. But, critics noted that it would also
be necessary to improve regulatory compatibility, develop and operate an information
exchange system, and establish a process for granting operating authority and increased
enforcement and compliance.96 President Bush recently provided the impetus for these
suggested changes. The Patriot Act,97 signed into law by the president on October 26,
2001, following the infamous events of September 11, 2001, and the Department of
Transportation Appropriations Bill,9" signed by President Bush on December 18, 2001,
does much to moot the debate. Collectively, they will spur many adjustments necessary
to address safety concerns for Mexican carriers operating beyond the commercial zone.
A. THE PATRIOT ACT
Included within the provisions of the newly enacted Patriot Act is the requirement
that no state issue a commercial license allowing a driver to transport hazardous materi-
als, unless that individual "does not pose a security risk:'99 The statute impacts NAFTA
because it applies to aliens as well as other individuals. °0 This requirement will be
94. Larue, supra note 88.
95. At the time of Fort's Motion to Suppress hearing, there were 371 officers assigned to inspect
over one million trucks in Texas. Only one out of every thousand trucks on the road were
inspected. Trooper Scales, a Texas License and Weight Inspector, testified that of the 20,000
commercial vehicles that traverse his area, he was able to stop only ten to twenty trucks
per day.
96. Skahan, supra note 76.
97. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept
and Obstruct Terrorism (USA Patriot Act) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56 sec. 1012, §5103a,
115 Stat. 272, 396.
98. Department of Transportation Appropriations Bill, Pub. L. No. 107-87 §350, 115 Stat. 864
(2001).
99. Patriot Act §1012, §5103a(a)(l); see also Appropriations Bill §350(b):
No vehicles owned or leased by a Mexican motor carrier and carrying hazardous materials in
a placardable quantity may be permitted to operate beyond a United States municipality or
commercial zone until the United States has completed an agreement with the Government
of Mexico which ensures that drivers of such vehicles carrying such placardable quantities
of hazardous materials meet substantially the same requirements as United States drivers
carrying such materials.
100. Id. §1012, §§5103a(c) & (d).
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accomplished through a three-part process.' First, the state must request a background
investigation of the applicant from the Attorney General. Next, the Attorney General,
undoubtedly through the FBI, will review criminal history databases, including those
maintained by INS in the case of aliens.' Lastly, the results of this check will be provided
to the Secretary of Transportation. Interestingly, it is the Secretary, not the Department
of Justice (DOJ), who will make the final determination concerning whether the indi-
vidual poses a security risk." 3 It is the Secretary who then tells the state whether an
individual poses a security risk. If a license is issued, the state must provide the Secretary
with the name, address, and other pertinent information of the licensed individual.
0 4
Domestic issues such as security have traditionally been the bailiwick of the DOJ.
Resolving questions concerning who poses a "security risk" is a new area for DOT. It
remains to be seen how gracefully and effectively these requirements will be juggled
among bureaucracies that include, at a minimum, the DOJ, the DOT, and the states.
Who will take the fingerprints necessary to initiate the security checks, what factors will
be utilized in determining what constitutes a "security risk" and who in the DOT will
make these determinations will be among many questions needing resolution.
B. THE APPROPRIATIONS BILL
After the publication of the proposed federal regulations that were to implement
NAFTA, unions, safety advocates, and members of Congress insisted that the regulations
did not go far enough. The recently passed Appropriations Bill has addressed many of the
fears raised during the debate. It has also provided guidance concerning how the federal
regulations should be modified to address the complicated issues raised by NAFTA that
will impact, at a minimum, the border states; the Departments of Justice, Commerce,
and Treasury; and the Environmental Protection Agency.' It is anticipated that the
regulations will be modified accordingly and clarified to comply with the Appropriations
Bill. 06
For now:, it ;S clpr that Mexicon truckers, both short- and long-haul, that seek
to operate either within or beyond the commercial zone must act in conformity with
the requirements imposed in the Appropriations Bill. The thrust of the bill, in effect,
forces Mexico to enact regulations similar to those of the United States. This is primarily
accomplished by requiring the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration to conduct
standardized safety examinations of each Mexican motor carrier."' Additionally, each
101. See generally id. §1012, §§5103(a)-(c).
102. Id. §1012.
103. Id. §1012, §§5103a(c)(1)(A) and (B).
104. Id. §1012, §5103a(d).
105. See generally Appropriations Bill §350.
106. The Appropriations Bill references the need to promulgate interim final regulations to ensure
that foreign carriers know of federal safety standards and that safety auditors be appropriately
trained and certified. It also requires that policies be established to standardize decisions such
as how many inspectors to utilize at the border. Id. §§350(a)(10)(A)-(E).
107. I. §350(a)(1)(A). No funds appropriated by the Bill may be expended for processing a
Mexican carrier's application to operate beyond the commercial zone until the Federal Motor
Carrier Safety Administration requires that a safety examination be performed.
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Mexican carrier must also pass an audit.' 8 This audit will essentially focus on four broad
areas which can be categorized as follows: whether the carrier keeps maintenance records
and has safety programs; whether the company keeps driver qualification files; whether
the company has a random alcohol and drug program; and whether the company has
driver hours of service requirements, which include keeping log books. 9 Vehicles that
pass the safety examination receive a decal, valid for ninety days, following which there
must be a reinspection." ° Companies that pass the audit will be issued a unique DOT
identifying number that must be reflected on the body of each vehicle."' Companies
who pass these hurdles are then granted conditional authority to operate beyond the
commercial zone.' 12
Mexican carriers seeking permanent operating authority to operate beyond the com-
mercial zone must complete a second full safety audit consistent with the evaluations
currently set forth for U.S. carriers in the Code of Federal Regulations." 3 This safety
review must take place within eighteen months of the time a carrier is granted condi-
tional operating authority."4 It appears that carriers who have been granted permanent
operating authority for three consecutive years would be subject to permissive rather than
mandatory inspections each time they seek to operate outside the commercial zone."'
The green light permitting Mexican vehicles to pass beyond the commercial zone
will activate only after the DOT Inspector General has conducted a comprehensive review
of border operations." 6 No trucks will operate beyond the commercial zone until the
requisite infrastructure (informational and otherwise), inspectors, on-site safety special-
ists, regulations, and policies are in place. Included is the requirement that Mexico's
informational infrastructure be integrated with ours to allow licenses, registrations, and
insurance to be verified." 7 Telecommunications must also be linked to allow quick and
easy verification at border crossings and a database created to allow safety monitoring
of all Mexican carriers that seek to operate beyond the commercial zone."' Following
108. On-site safety inspections are required for 50 percent of all Mexican carriers and must com-
prise at least 50 percent of estimated truck traffic in any year. Id. §350(a)(1)(C).
109. Id. §§350(a)(I)(A) & (B). The examination includes verifying performance data and safety
management programs; drug and alcohol testing programs; hours of service rules; proof of
insurance, the carrier's safety history and preparedness to comply with Federal Motor Carrier
Safety and Hazardous Material rules and regulations; drivers' qualifications; an evaluation of
the carrier's inspection, maintenance and repair facilities, and an interview with officials of
the motor carrier to review safety management controls, policies and practices.
110. Id. §350(a).
111. Appropriations Bill §350(a)(4). "[A] distinctive Department of Transportation number to
each Mexican motor carrier operating beyond the commercial zone to assist inspectors in
enforcing motor carrier safety regulations including hours-of-service rules under part 395 of
title 49, Code of Federal Regulations" Id. §350(a)(4).
112. Id. §350(a)(l)(A).
113. Id. §350(a)(2); see also 49 C.F.R. pt. 385.
114. Appropriations Bill §350(a)(2).
115. Id. §350(a)(5). Inspectors are required to electronically verify the validity and status of the
license of each commercial Mexican motor carrier driver who carries hazardous materials
and on a random basis for other carriers. ld. §350(a)(3).
116. Id. §350(c)(1).
117. Id. §350(c)(1)(E).
118. Id. §§350(c)(1)(E) & (G).
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this, the Secretary of Transportation must certify that no unacceptable safety risk will be
posed by opening the border."
9
III. Conclusion
The United States Supreme Court has permitted warrantless searches of federally
licensed firearms dealers,120 mines and stone quarries, 121 and junkyards.' 22 Under its
statutory scheme, Texas has established a constitutionally adequate statutory scheme,
which likewise accords it the ability to conduct warrantless administrative searches in
the critical sector of commercial vehicles. The state has a substantial governmental inter-
est in traveler safety and this interest is reflected in a regulatory approach that limits
inspections made "pursuant to narrow statutes and regulations directed at a particular
industry."'23 For these reasons, trucks can be randomly stopped and inspected under
the Texas Commercial Motor Vehicles Act, which provides a constitutionally adequate
substitute for a warrant in terms of the limits of its application.
Officials must be able to conduct driver and vehicle safety checks, particularly for
problems that may not be apparent to officers on patrol. 24 This necessity is more
pronounced because of NAFTA. It has been suggested that "most Mexican trucks will
never pass U.S. Department of Transportation standards.' ' 25 This remains to be seen as
Mexican drivers seeking to transport beyond the border will now be required to meet
standards like those imposed on domestic drivers, including hours of service and safety
119. Id. §350(c)(2).
120. See Biswell, 406 U.S. at 311 (involving the warrantless search of a pawnshop operator done
pursuant to the Gun Control act of 1968). The statute permitted entry onto the premises of
any firearms or ammunition dealer in order to examine documents such dealers were required
to keep. Id. at 311, 312 n.l. "Illf the law is to be properly enforced and inspection made
effective, inspections without warrant must be deemed reasonable official conduct under the
Fourth Amendment." Id. at 315-16; but see Colonade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S.
72 (1970) (involving the forcible warrantless search of a catering business). Federal revenue
statutes permitted inspection of liquor dealers, however, the search was disapproved because
the statute did not provide for forcible entry without a warrant. In drafting the statute,
Congress had made it a criminal offense to refuse inspection. Id. at 76.
121. See Donovan, 452 U.S. at 594 (involving the attempted warrantless search of a mine con-
ducted pursuant to the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977). Section 103(a) of the
Act specifically provided "no advance notice of an inspection shall be provided to any per-
son." In upholding the inspection program, the Court held that "a warrant requirement could
significantly frustrate effective enforcement of the Act. . . '[lln [light] of the notorious ease
with which many safety and health hazards may be concealed if advance warning of inspec-
tion is obtained, a warrant requirement would seriously undercut this Act's objectives." Id.
(quoting S. Rep. No. 95-181, 27, U.S.C.C.A.N. 3401, 3427 (1977)).
122. Burger, 482 U.S. at 691. For an overview of the federal circuit decisions allowing warrant-
less searches in a variety of contexts, see generally Annual Review of Criminal Procedure,
Warrantless Searches and Seizures, 89 GEO. L.J. 1151-1155 n.343 (2001).
123. Means, 94 F.3d at 1426-27.
124. See Hernandez, 901 F.2d at 1219.
125. Watson, supra note 80.
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equipment requirements. Although American safety standards can be imposed on Mexi-
can trucks, it will never be possible to inspect each truck on each occasion that it crosses
the border.'26 For this reason, post-border regulatory inspections become even more
critical. The Appropriations Bill does much to promote uniformity in commercial safety
rules. It now appears that each country will also operate from an identical database
with respect to driver information, commercial drivers' license numbers, and the ability
to track safety violators.'27 Compliance review audits will likewise be required.'28 Tens
of millions of dollars have been appropriated to hire inspectors and auditors as well
as to create and build necessary technology and facilities.' 29 Although many questions
remain to be answered, the new Appropriations Bill together with certain provisions of
the Patriot Act are at least a beginning toward allaying concerns over safety and the
"inadequate harmonization between Mexican and U.S. trucking standards."' 30
For the many proponents of free trade, NAFTA is, at first blush, an admirable idea.
In execution, its complexities are staggering. The taxpayer costs of implementing NAFTA,
particularly as they relate to Mexican trucks operating beyond the commercial zone, are
enormous. Numerous federal agencies will be impacted by NAFTA and layers of bureau-
cracy will have to be added to federal and State governments to address a myriad of
concerns. The phenomenal increase in road traffic, which is assured, will undoubtedly
take its toll in increasing numbers of accidents. So too will it impact pollution levels and
the condition of our highway system, already sorely in need of improvement and invest-
ment. Following September 11, 2001, we were left with heightened concerns over how
to protect our borders against terrorism and smuggling. Although it presently appears
that we are on target to open the border with Mexico to commercial traffic by summer
of 2002, it remains to be seen whether we will be better served or worse as a result of
NAFTA.
126. Case, supra note 76.
127. Appropriations Bill §§350(c)(1)(E) & (G); see Goff, supra note 75, at 8.
128. Appropriations Bill §350(b)(2).
129. Id. §350(f). Additionally, states will be given money to build weigh stations and motion
stations to screen truckers. Id. §350(a)(7)(A).
130. Skahan, supra note 76, at 605.

